I blogger hanno fatto molto, in questi ultimi anni, per dare anche altre informazioni sul Medio Oriente, rispetto a quelle che si trovano sulle testate mainstream, di carta o virtuali. Ne è convinta una delle blogger-analiste più note, Helena Cobban, l’autrice di Just World News. Ma non solo. Ne devono essere convinti anche quelli di J Street, che alla loro prima conferenza ospita non solo Helena Cobban, ma anche gli altri blogger più conosciuti negli States.
Precisazione (d’obbligo) di Richard Silverstein di Tikun Olam:
For those who may have the long knives out for J Street in the right-wing pro-Israel media. Our event is not officially sponsored by J Street and nothing said during our session should be construed as representing J Street’s views. We are bloggers and independent actors. We do not speak for J Street and they do not endorse our statements. They have graciously offered us a physical space during their conference. But that is where the relationship ends.
E’ la storia di una protesta verde a Damietta, sul Delta del Nilo, in Egitto. Una protesta contro una grande fabbrica di fertilizzanti, la Agrium, un consorzio canadese.
The Damietta protests may well mark a watershed for environmental mobilization in Egypt. The coalition that emerged to oppose the EAgrium plant crossed class and occupational lines, and included representatives of voluntary associations, members of Parliament, businessmen, university professors, landowners, and members of unions and professional syndicates. These groups employed a diverse repertoire of protest tactics and mobilizing strategies, including coordinated statements, petitions, marches, vigils, litigation and strikes. The coalition also framed its concerns in ways that resonated with the vast majority of Egyptians struggling to cope with the rapidly deteriorating conditions in the Delta. Mobilization against the factory emphasized the health threats posed by polluting industries, the subsidy of foreign investors, pervasive government corruption and the lack of environmental enforcement. These concerns were diffused through Egypt’s increasingly lively public and media sphere, including new independent newspapers, private TV stations and well-known regional satellite channels such as al-Jazeera.
The diverse protest tactics employed in Damietta are part of a larger wave of social protest that has washed over Egypt in recent years. Strikes, sit-ins, petitions, road closures and demonstrations of all kinds are increasingly employed by a dizzying array of actors, including textile workers, ambulance drivers, public sector employees, syndicate members, farmers and others. Egypt’s authoritarian regime has responded with a mixture of repression and accommodation. While the regime has ringed striking workers with security personnel, often leading to arrests and skirmishes, it has also sought to placate them with wage increases, bonuses and other economic benefits. In stark contrast, protesters making political demands have invariably been met with force.
Mahmoud Abbas proclama le elezioni presidenziali e parlamentari con un decreto per il prossimo 24 gennaio. Una mossa che è come un sasso nello stagno: muove le acque del processo di riconciliazione tra Hamas e Fatah, ridivenute ferme dopo lo scandalo del voto sul rapporto Goldstone. Si rimette in gioco la questione della legittimità di un potere politico e istituzionale palestinese, e cioè il vero nodo nella definizione di un partner palestinese nella ripresa di un negoziato di pace con Israele. Occorre un partner legittimo, e in fretta? Allora si rompono gli indugi, in un momento in cui Abbas risente ancora delle conseguenze del rapporto Goldstone, e si indicono le elezioni politiche e presidenziali. Requiescant in pace i colloqui sulla riconciliazione nazionale, e soprattutto la proposta egiziana, di indire elezioni per il 28 giugno 2010. Un rinvio di sei mesi che gli analisti palestinesi consideravano un compromesso possibile, a cui Hamas e Fatah potevano aderire.
E per finire “in bellezza”, l’analisi di Rami Khouri sul Daily Star libanese.
Netanyahu is both stronger and weaker for successfully resisting to date the US call to freeze settlements. He is stronger at home for standing up to the US, yet he is also weaker in the negotiations process because all his attempts to divert or stall the process have been rejected. These include making Iran a greater priority than Israel-Palestine, focusing on economic progress or Salam Fayyad’s Palestinian state-building plan, securing Arab acceptance of Israel as a “Jewish state,” stressing Palestinian security moves and commitments to Israel before anything else happens, or asking for unconditional talks without any prior commitments or gestures. [...]
Abbas is weaker than he was nine months ago and the Palestinian side remains badly divided between Hamas and Fatah. Hamas continues to assert itself as an important player and must be included in a future reconfigured Palestinian government, though it has also become clear that Hamas is a minority party among all Palestinians, enjoying around 15-20 percent popular support. The US is not pushing too hard because it knows that no progress will be made while the Palestinians remain divided as they are now. Re-legitimizing the entire Palestinian governance system must occur in the next nine months – presidency, parliament, cabinet, security services and the councils of the Palestine Liberation Organization – before any meaningful diplomacy with Israel can occur.